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JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this appeal 
pursuant to Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure and 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j) (1988, as amended). 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Is an creditor precluded from collecting on a judgment 
arising out of a debt secured by a second trust deed on real 
property when by the time such creditor is able to foreclose on the 
property a first trust deed holder on the same property has already 
commenced foreclosure proceedings and thereafter forecloses ahead 
of such judgment creditor. 
The trial court's ruling on this issue is a conclusion of law. 
Trial court conclusions of law are accorded no particular def-
ference and are reviewed for correctness. Ward v. Richfield City, 
798 P.2d 757 (Utah 1990). 
2. Should the amount which can be collected on the judgment 
referred to in issue no. 1. above be limited to the fair market 
value of the property securing the trust deeds and the amount of 
the judgment. 
The trial court's ruling on this issue is a conclusion of law. 
Trial court conclusions of law are accorded no particular def-
ference and are reviewed for correctness. Ward v. Richfield City, 
798 P.2d 757 (Utah 1990). 
RELEVANT STATUTES 
Form of Action — Judgment — Special Execution. 
There can be one action for the recovery of any debt or 
the enforcement of any rights secured solely by mortgage 
upon real estate, which action must be in accordance with 
the provisions of this chapter. Judgment shall be given 
adjudging the amount due, with costs in disbursements 
and the sale of mortgage property, or some part thereof, 
to satisfy said amount and accruing costs, and directing 
the sheriff to proceed and sell the same according to the 
provisions of law relating to sales on execution, and a 
special execution or order of sale shall be issued for 
that purpose. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-37-1 (1953) 
Sale of trust property by trustee — action to recover balance 
due upon obligation for which trust deed was given as security — 
Collection of costs and attorney's fees. 
At any time within three months after any sale 
of property under a trust deed, as hereinabove 
provided, an action may be commenced to re-
cover the balance due upon the obligation for 
which the trust deed was given as security, 
and in such action the complaint shall set 
forth the entire amount of the indebtedness 
which was secured by such trust deed, the 
amount for which such property was sold, and 
the fair market value thereof at the date of 
sale. Before rendering judgment, the court 
shall find the fair market value at the date 
of sale of the property sold. The court may 
not render judgment for more than the amount 
by which the amount of the indebtedness with 
interest, costs, and expenses of sale, in-
cluding trusteefs and attorney's fees, exceeds 
the fair market value of the property as of 
the date of the sale. In any action brought 
under this section, the prevailing party shall 
be entitled to collect its costs and reason-
able attorney fees incurred in bringing an 
action under this section. 
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Utah Code Ann, § 57-1-32 (1953). 
STATEMENT OF THE CA8E 
Nature Of The Case, Course Of Proceedings 
And Disposition In The Court Below 
This action and lower Court proceedings involved a complaint 
by Plaintiffs/Appellants Joseph D. Sanders and Cheryl M. Sanders 
(hereinafter collectively, "Sanders") seeking relief against 
Defendants/Appellees Martin S. Ovard, Reva S. Ovard, Ben F. Ovard 
and Helen Ovard (hereinafter collectively, "Ovards") and Jax Hayes 
Pettey who was the trustee under a trust deed given by Sanders to 
Ovards* Sanders1 Complaint alleged fraud on the part of Ovards in 
the sale of real property by Ovards to Sanders and sought relief 
in the form of damages or, in the alternative, rescission of 
contract and for injunctive relief precluding Ovards from continu-
ing foreclosure proceedings upon real property under a trust deed 
given by Sanders to Ovards. Ovards1 counterclaimed seeking 
judgment against Senders on a promissory note given by Sanders to 
Ovards and seeking judicial foreclosure of the trust deed given by 
Sanders to Ovards to secure such note. After trial the lower court 
entered judgment denying relief to Sanders, awarding monetary 
judgment to Ovards and allowing Ovards to conclude their non-
judicial foreclosure proceeding. Such judgment was previously 
affirmed by the Utah Court of Appeals on an appeal by Sanders. 
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Statement of Facts 
1. In September 1982, Ovards' sold to Sanders certain 
residential real property located in Draper, Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah (the "Property"), and as a part of the purchase 
price, Sanders gave to Ovards a promissory note (the "Note") 
secured by a second trust deed on the Property (the "Trust Deed"). 
(R. 201-202). 
2. Sanders made only one payment required under the Note, and 
Defendants attempted to foreclose the Trust Deed in non-judicial 
trust deed foreclosure proceedings. (R. 204-205). 
3. Such trust deed foreclosure proceedings were enjoined 
after Sanders commenced this action, and Ovards then filed a 
counterclaim to foreclose the Trust Deed in the manner provided by 
law for the foreclosure of mortgages on real property, (R, 2 04-
205) . 
4. Sanders raised election of remedies as a, defense to 
Ovards1 counterclaim, and the parties and the lower court, in 
conference prior to trial, resolved the issue of election of 
remedies by requiring that if Ovards prevailed at trial they would 
not continue with the judicial mortgage foreclosure, but would 
proceed with their non-judicial trust deed foreclosure procedure, 
(R. 203). 
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5. The lower Court concluded that Sanders had not been 
defrauded by Ovards as alleged in Sanders' Complaint, that Sanders 
were not entitled to damages or rescission of contract, and the 
injunction previously issued precluding Ovards from foreclosing 
their Trust Deed should be terminated. (R. 205-206). 
6. The lower court, concluded that Plaintiffs had defaulted 
in payments to Ovards under the Note and that Ovards were entitled 
to Judgment for principal and interest and for attorneys' fees and 
costs attributable to Ovards1 counterclaim. (R. 206 and 207). 
7. Based upon the foregoing, judgment (the "Judgment") was 
awarded by the lower court on June 6, 1988: 
(a) Denying Sanders the relief requested in their com-
plaint and terminating the injunction theretofore entered 
which enjoined Ovards from completing their trust deed 
foreclosure proceedings; 
(b) Awarding judgment in favor of Ovards and against 
Sanders in the amount of $40,600.50 consisting of principal, 
interest, costs and attorneys' fees; 
(c) Adjudicating that Ovards had a valid lien on the 
Property and that Ovards were entitled to complete their non-
judicial foreclosure of the Trust Deed. (R. 210-214). 
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8. Sanders1 appealed the Judgment (R. 257),and the Utah Court 
of Appeals affirmed the Judgment by order of affirmance dated March 
14, 1990. (R. 269-270). 
9. Sanders then petitioned the Utah Supreme Court for a Writ 
of Certiorari, which petition was denied July 6, 1990. (Addendum 
1.) . 
10. Prior to the Judgment and on February 1, 1988, Mountain-
west Savings & Loan ("Mountainwest") began foreclos>ure proceedings 
on the Property pursuant to a trust deed recorded prior to the 
Ovards1 Trust Deed. (R. 297 Exhibit "A", p. 2) and (R. 201-202). 
11. Mountainwest held its Trustee1 s Sale on the Property on 
September 1, 1988 and received from such foreclosure sale only an 
amount equal to that owed to Mountainwest, leaving no excess 
amounts available for junior encumbrances. (R. 297 Exhibit "A", 
pp. 2-3). 
12. On August 7, 1990, Ovards filed a motion for deficiency 
judgment in the amount of* the Judgment, plus interest and attor-
neys' fees, (R. 289-297), but withdrew such motion on August 31, 
1990. (R. 329-330). The motion was withdrawn because it was 
determined that in light of Ovards1 security having been exhausted 
by Mountainwest's trust deed sale, such motion was unnecessary and 
that Ovards could proceed to execute directly on the Judgment. (R. 
349) . 
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13, Sanders filed a motion for an order clarifying the 
Judgment and seeking credit against the Judgment for the fair 
market value of the Property which Sanders would have received if 
Ovards had conducted a trust deed sale after being awarded the 
Judgment. (R. 329-336). 
14. The trial court entered its order clarifying the Judgment 
and ordering that: 
(a) The Judgment entitled Ovards to proceed with a non-
judicial foreclosure sale, but did not require them to do so; 
(b) The Judgment is a valid and binding judgment and 
Ovards are entitled to collect thereon; 
(c) The first lienholder [Mountainwest] had already 
foreclosed on the Property, and any lien Ovards may have had 
on the Property had been extinguished and Ovards were entitled 
to maintain a direct action to collect on the Judgment. 
(R. 284-286). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Ovards, as a junior lienholder, did not violate the one action 
rule by not bidding at the trust deed foreclosure sale of a senior 
lienholder or by not holding their own foreclosure sale. Any loss 
of value of the property is not the fault or responsibility of 
Ovards, but is the fault of Sanders for not paying the senior lien 
and thus causing its foreclosure. Limitation on the amount of 
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deficiencies in trust deed foreclosures is not applicable to this 
case and does not limit the amount of the Judgment. Ovards are 
entitled to collect the full amount of the Judgment, and they are 
entitled to attorney's fees on appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
I. Ovards1 Actions as a Junior Lienholder Have Not Violated 
Utahfs "One Action Rule". 
A. Utah's One Action Rule. 
The one action rule is found in Utah Code Ann. § 78-37-1 
(1953) , and provides that "There can be one action for the recovery 
of any debt or the enforcement of any right secured solely by 
mortgage upon real estate . . . ." While this rule refers to 
mortgages, it is well established that the provision applies 
equally to trust deeds. City Consumerfs Services, Inc. v. Peters, 
815 P.2d 234, 236 (Utah 1991); First Sec. Bank v. Felqer, 658 
F.Supp. 175, 181 (D. Utah 1987). The rule allows a lender to 
pursue a borrower on a deficiency claim only after the collateral 
has been exhausted through foreclosure by the lender or by a senior 
lienholder. Felqer at 181; Lockhart v. Equitable Realty Co., 657 
P.2d 1333, 1334 (Utah 1983). 
The purpose of the one action rule, often referred to as the 
security first rule, is two-fold. First, it is "to protect the 
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borrower against a multiplicity of actions when the separate 
actions are so closely connected that normally they can and should 
be decided in one proceeding. The second purpose is to compel a 
lienholder who has been given a lien on land to exhaust his 
security before attempting to reach any unmortgaged property to 
satisfy his lien, G. Nelson & D. Whitman, Real Estate Finance Law. 
§ 8,2 (2d ed. 1985). The lienholder cannot disregard his security 
nor may there be a waiver of the security through a provision in 
the mortgage or trust deed. 
B. The Exception to the One Action Rule. 
The consequences of the one action rule can be avoided if 
lenders, such as Ovards, satisfy the conditions for the exception 
to the rule. That is, a lender can exercise his right to recover 
on the debt that was once secured by a lien on real property if the 
security has been lost through no fault of the lender. The court 
in Lockhart stated that the "Mortgagee must show the security has 
been foreclosed and sold or otherwise lost by no fault of the 
mortgagee . . . ." Lockhart at 1336. See also, City Consumer 
Services, Inc. v. Peters, 815 P.2d 234, 236 (1991); Cache Valley 
Banking Company v. Logan, 56 P.2d 1046, 1049 (Utah 1936). 
Appellants claim that Ovards1 were required by the one action 
rule to protect their security by purchasing the Property at 
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Mountainwest•s foreclosure sale, or by holding their own fore-
closure sale. 
The issue of whether a junior lienholder is at fault by not 
bidding at a senior lienholder's foreclosure sale arose in Felcrer. 
Judge Winder ruled in favor of the non-bidding junior lienholder 
bank. As a matter of law, "the bank's action in allowing the 
second lien to be extinguished by not bidding at the sale of the 
first priority trust deed was not negligent or blameworthy." Id. 
at 182. 
This Court more recently in Peters held that a junior 
lienholder is not barred by the one action rule from preceding 
against the debtor after the junior lienholder failed to bid at a 
senior lienholderfs trust deed sale. Peters, dealt with the same 
issue as presented in the instant case. The Court reasoned that 
the effect of the one action rule is to regulate the procedure of 
recovery by a secured creditor, but not to deny the right to 
recover. Peters at 237. Further, the court stated that a junior 
lienholder1s failure to participate in a senior lienholderfs 
foreclosure is not blameworthy. "It was no fault of the junior 
lienholder that the security for its note was lost. The fault is 
rather with the debtor for failing to pay the first mortgage and 
thus causing it to t>e foreclosed." Id. at 236, quoting Logan at 
1049. 
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Utah's one action rule is virtually identical to California's 
version of the one action rule. Peters at 236. In interpreting 
California's One Action Rule, Justice Traynor in Roseleaf Corp. v. 
Chierighino, 378 P.2d 97 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 1963), emphasized that once 
a senior lienholder had exhausted the security, a junior lienholder 
was free to execute and enforce his right to recover. Supportive 
reasoning given by Justice Traynor, and as quoted by this court in 
Peters, involves comparing the respective positions of a junior 
and senior lienholder: 
The position of a junior lienor whose security is lost 
through a senior sale is different from that of a selling 
senior lienor. A selling senior can make certain that 
the security brings and amount equal to his claim against 
the debtor or the fair market value, whichever is less, 
simply by bidding in for that amount. He need not invest 
any additional funds. The junior lienor, however, is in 
no better position to protect himself than is the debtor. 
Either would have to invest additional funds to redeem 
or buy in at the sale. Equitable considerations favor 
placing this burden on the debtor, not only because it 
is his fault that provokes the senior sale, but also 
because he has the benefit of his bargain with the junior 
lienor who, unlike the selling senior, might otherwise 
end up with nothing. 
Roseleaf at 100, cited by Peters at 236-237. (Emphasis added in 
Peters). 
Thus, Ovards, as a junior lienholder, are not required to go 
through a fruitless procedure. They decided not to hold their own 
foreclosure sale or to bid at the first lienholder's foreclosure 
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sale. There was no economic justification for doing so. This is 
sufficient reason for their action or inaction 
II. Ovards Were Not Required to Hold Their Own Foreclosure 
Sale. 
Sanders1 argues that the Judgment required Ovards to im-
mediately conduct their own foreclosure sale after entry of the 
Judgment and notwithstanding that Mountainwest had already com-
menced its non-judicial foreclosure proceedings. The basis for 
Sanders1 position is paragraph 6. of the Judgment, which states 
that Ovards were entitled to complete their non-judicial fore-
closure of the Trust Deed and providing for a procedure by which 
Ovards would seek a deficiency if there was a deficiency after such 
a sale. (R. 213, Addendum 2.). 
While the Judgment stated Ovards were entitled to complete 
foreclosure of the Trust Deed it did not state that they were 
required to do so, and the basis for this provision in the Judgment 
was not that the lower court was ordering Ovards to complete their 
foreclosure. Rather, the reason for such provision is found in the 
lower courtfs finding of fact number 11. (R. 203, Addendum 3.). 
In their reply to Ovards1 counterclaim seeking to foreclose the 
Trust Deed as a mortgage, Sanders1 asserted an affirmative defense 
of election of remedies (R. 81) . Evidently, Sanders were asserting 
that Ovards had elected to foreclose the Trust Deed through the 
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non-judicial foreclosure proceeding and therefore could not later 
seek to foreclose the Trust Deed as a mortgage notwithstanding that 
Sanders had sought and obtained an injunction against Ovards 
proceeding with the non-judicial foreclosure proceeding. 
This issue of whether Ovards, if successful at trial, would 
proceed with non-judicial or judicial foreclosure of the Trust Deed 
was resolved by the court and the parties prior to trial as noted 
in the above referenced finding of fact. As in the Judgment, the 
court did not in the finding of fact reguire Ovards to conduct a 
foreclosure sale. The court simply noted in finding of fact number 
11 that this issue had been raised by Sanders and that it would be 
resolved by Ovards proceeding with the remedy of a non-judicial 
foreclosure sale if they were successful at trial. The court later 
so clarified the Judgment. (R. 284-286, Addendum 4.). 
By the time Ovards were successful at trial and had obtained 
the Judgment, Mountainwest had already commenced its non-judicial 
foreclosure proceeding and completed it just under three months 
later. Based upon Mountainwest's pending and ongoing foreclosure 
proceeding, Ovards determined not to conduct their own foreclosure 
sale prior to Mountainwest1s foreclosure sale. Because Ovards were 
in a position junior to Mountainwest, any foreclosure sale con-
ducted by Ovards and any purchase at that sale would have been 
inferior and subject to Mountainwest's position and sale, whether 
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Ovards1 sale occurred prior to or subsequent to Mountainwest!s 
sale. 
III. Ovards are entitled to Collect the Full Amount of the 
Judgment. 
A. Equity Does Not Bar Ovards From Pursuing Collec-
tion of the Full Amount of the Judgment. 
Sanders1 argues that in failing to protect their interest in 
the Property prior to Mountainwestfs foreclosure sale, Ovards 
caused Sanders to lose a claimed equity amount in the property over 
and above Mountainwestfs lien and that the equities involved 
require that the Judgment should be reduced by that amount. 
Even if there was equity in the property over and above 
Mountainwest•s lien, such exact situation existed in Peters, where 
the property in that case was appraised at $70,000, the first 
lienholder was owed approximately $50,000 and the second lienholder 
was owed approximately $17,000. Peters at 235. It could thus have 
been projected that the second lienholder could have purchased at 
the,first lienholder1s sale by paying the approximately $50,000 to 
the first lienholder, and the second lienholder could then have 
made itself whole on the $17,000 owed to it out of the $20,000 
equity remaining after payment to the first lienholder. Neverthe-
less, this Court did not require such action by a junior lien-
holder. 
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Furthermore, this Court has held that it is not the fault of 
a junior lienholder that property securing such lien is lost 
through foreclosure by a first lienholder. 
It was no fault of the Plaintiff that the 
security for its note was lost. The fault is 
rather with Defendant for failing to pay the 
first mortgage and thus causing it to be 
foreclosed. 
Logan, supra at 1049. Also, as Justice Traynor stated: 
A junior lienholder is in no better position 
to protect himself than is a debtor. He 
either would have to invest additional funds 
to buy or protect the property. Equitable 
considerations favor placing this burden on 
the debtor, not only because it is his fault 
that provokes the senior sale, but also be-
cause he has the benefit of his bargain with 
the junior lienor who, unlike the selling 
lienor, might otherwise end up with nothing. 
Roseleaf, supra at 100. 
Therefore, the burden of protecting property subject to 
multiple liens falls upon the debtor, not the creditor. The debtor 
not only causes loss from foreclosure and sale by the first 
lienholder by not having paid the first lien, but also has received 
the benefit of a second lien by receipt of the consideration for 
which the second lien was given. Thus, contrary to Sanders1 
position, it is they who were required to have protected the 
Property by prior redemption or by bidding at Mountainwest's 
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foreclosure sale, and they cannot complain that Ovards did not do 
so. 
B. Utah Code Ann. S 57-1-32 f!953) Does Not Require 
Limitation of the Amount of the Judgment. 
Without citing Utah Code Ann. 57-1-31 (1953), Sanders1 claim 
and argue for its benefit. This statute limits any deficiency 
after a trust deed sale to the difference between the total amount 
owed to the creditor and the fair market value of the property 
sold. Sanders' argue that the Judgment should be reduced by the 
amount which fair market value of the Property exceeded the amount 
of Mountainwest•s lien. 
This Court held in Peters that § 57-1-31 is not applicable to 
a junior lienholder when the security has been lost through a prior 
foreclosure by a senior lienholder. 
IV. Ovards are Entitled to Attorney's Fees on Appeal, 
The trial court ruled that Ovards were entitled to and it 
awarded them contractual attorney's fees against Sanders for their 
default under the Note and in connection with Ovards1 counterclaim. 
The Judgment, including attorney's fees, has been affirmed by the 
Utah Court of Appeals. This appeal involves rights asserted by 
Ovards in the counterclaim and that portion of the Judgment awarded 
on the counterclaim. 
-16-
The general rule is that when a party who received attorney's 
fees in the trial court prevails on appeal, that party is also 
entitled to attorney's fees on appeal. Utah Dept. of Social 
Services v. Adams, 806 P.2d 1193, 1197 (Utah 1991). Contractual 
provisions for payment of attorney's fees include fees incurred by 
the prevailing party on appeal. Management Services Corp. v. 
Development Associates. 617 P.2d 406, 409 (Utah 1980). 
Ovards should be awarded attorney's fees, and remand should 
be made to the trial court to determine the amount of such fees. 
CONCLUSION 
Ovards are entitled to collect the Judgment, and it is not 
required to be reduced by the amount, if any, by which the value 
of the Property exceeded the amount of Mountainwest1s lien. 
Ovards are entitled to attorney's fees on appeal. 
DATED December 30, 1991. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CROWTHER & REED 
T^ottai? UY Crowther 
Jame.g/j . Lund 
A t t o r n e y s fo r Defendants / 
Appe l l e e s 
- 1 7 -
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The foregoing Brief of Appellees was served upon Plaintiffs-
/Appellants by mailing, postage prepaid, four true and correct 
copies thereof to Appellant's counsel, Frederick N« Green and July 
V. Lund, at 528 Newhouse Building, 10 Exchange Place, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84111 this ^j day of December, 1991. 
CROWTHER & REED 
Bv OQ&J 
•Miptope- N'v' Crowther 
J a m ^ 7 J . Lund 
A t t o r n e y s fo r Defendan t s / 
A p p e l l e e s 
- 1 8 -
ADDENDUM 1 
STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 
July 6, 1990 
OFFICE OF THE CLERK 
Thomas N. Crowther, Esq. 
PARSONS & CROWTHER 
455 South 300 East 
Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Joseph D. Sanders and 
Cheryl M. Sanders, 
Plaintiffs and Petitioners, 
v. No. 900169 
Martin S. Ovard, Reva S. 
Ovard, Ben F. Ovard, Helen T. 
Ovard and Jax Hayes Pettey, 
Defendants and Respondents, 
v. 
Joseph D. Sanders, Cheryl M. 
Sanders, Utah State Tax 
Commission, Salt Lake County, 
and Insurance Commpany of North 
America, 
Counterdefendants. 
This day Petition for Writ of Certiorari having been heretofore 
considered, and the Court being sufficiently advised in the 
premises, it is ordered that the same be, and hereby is, denied. 
Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk 
ADDENDUM 2 
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JOSEPH D. SANDERS, CHERYL M. 
SANDERS, UTAH STATE TAX 
COMMISSION, SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
and INSURANCE' COMPANY 
NORTH AMERICA, 
Counterdefendantr 
JUDGMENT ANP r.-KCl'W:: m.' 
FORECT.OS"RP 
C i v i l N o . OC> •• 4 i 
J u d g e N o e l 
111" h n • 11 11< * v i < i ' 1 1 1 in I l M i l , 11 ' i in in 1 r i m I > 1 1 1 in in if' 11 n i i a i" 1 v 1 " > i i" r i a l u i i 
October 26 and /!*/ 138/, before the Honorable Fr-ink "1. IIUML, 
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Judge of the above-entitled court, sitting without a jury, with 
David R. Olsen and Gary R. Henrie of the law firm of SUITTER, 
AXLAND, ARMSTRONG & HANSON appearing as counsel for Plaintiffs, 
and with Thomas N. Crowther of the law firm of PARSONS & CROWTHER 
appearing as counsel for Defendants and with no appearance having 
been made by or on behalf of Counterdefendants Utah State Tax 
Commission, Salt Lake County and Insurance Company of North 
America, with Defendants having stipulated to the dismissal of 
Counterdef endants Utah State Tax Commission and Salt Lake County 
and Defendants and Counterdefendant Insurance Company of North 
America having stipulated as to issues between them. Having 
heard testimony of witnesses, having received and reviewed 
exhibits, having heard arguments of counsel at trial and having 
heard arguments of counsel at a hearing on February 12, 1988, on 
Defendant's Motion for Attorney's Fees, having taken the issues 
and matters raised at trial and upon Defendant's Motion for 
Attorney's Fees under advisement, the Court with the parties 
agreement having personally viewed the property in question, 
having heard arguments of Counsel on Plaintiff's objections to 
Defendants' proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law and 
judgment and decree of foreclosure, and being now fully advised 
in the premises and of the law and facts in this matter, and 
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attached hereto (the "Property") for payment of the amounts and 
judgment referred to in the immediately preceding paragraph. 
5. Any claimed right, title or interest of Counterdefendant 
Insurance Company of North America is subordinate and inferior to 
the Trust Deed and Defendants1 interest in the Property. 
6. Defendants shall be entitled to complete their 
non-judicial foreclosure of the Trust Deed. All requirements for 
such foreclosure are deemed to have complied with except for the 
giving and posting of notice of sale, which must still be 
accomplished by Defendants. Pursuant to law applicable to trust 
deed sales there shall be no redemption rights after sale, and 
any deficiency shall be limited to the difference between amounts 
owed by Plaintiffs to Defendants hereunder, plus any subsequent 
allowable costs and fees, and the fair market value of the 
Property at the date of sale. In the event of a deficiency and 
an action by Defendants therefor, such action may be pursued by 
motion and evidentiary hearing in this action without the 
necessity of Defendants commencing a new and separate action. 
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DATED W f (»;)_f 1988 
HUT: 
^ 
Frank G. No 
Distri "*• '"' * 
PROVED A r* <-«•> rn/>T^*f . 
; I'TSR, Ay I *ND, ARMSTRONG 
, HANS-
/f 
.y ^V /£ &uu < 
H. DIXON Hmc.^Y 
ny Jjii--i£nu 
EXHIBIT "A" 
B e g i n n i n g a t a p o i n t 716 .85 f e e t Nor th 0 ° 2 3 ' 0 8 " E a s t from t h e 
Eas t q u a r t e r corner of Sec t i on 6, Township 4 South , Range 1 E a s t , 
S a l t Lake Base and M e r i d i a n , and runn ing thence South 76°11 , 02" 
West 186.90 f e e t ; thence Nor th 0 o 2 3 f 0 8 " E a s t 2 0 2 . 5 f e e t ; t h e n c e 
N o r t h 7 6 ° l l l 0 2 " E a s t 186 .90 f e e t ; t h e n c e Sou th 0 ° 2 3 f 0 8 " West 
202.5 f e e t t o the p o i n t of b e g i n n i n g . 
T o g e t h e r w i t h a 35 f o o t wide r i g h t of way c o n n e c t i n g t o 13800 
South S t r e e t , and s u b j e c t t o a 35 foo t wide r i g h t of way a d j a c e n t 
t o and p a r a l l e l w i t h t h e West l i n e of s u b j e c t p r o p e r t y d e s c r i b e d 
as f o l l o w s : 
A 35 f o o t wide s t r i p of l a n d , t h e c e n t e r l i n e of which b e g i n s 
299.95 f e e t North 89°39 '27" West from t h e E a s t q u a r t e r c o r n e r of 
S e c t i o n 6, Township 4 S o u t h , Range 1 E a s t , S a l t Lake Base and 
Meridian and runs thence North 0 ° 2 3 l 0 8 " E a s t 3 1 1 . 3 0 f e e t ; t h e n c e 
N o r t h 1 6 o 5 1 ' 0 2 " E a s t 332 .85 f e e t ; t h e n c e Nor th 0 ° 2 3 , 0 8 " E a s t 
200.88 f e e t . 

PARSONS & CROWTHER 
Attorneys for Defenu-
455 South Thira Eas* 
Sal t Lake '*" " ' 
Telephone 
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COURT 
•TATE OF ^AH 
JOSEPH D. SANDERS and CHERYL M. 
SANDERS, 
Plaintiff, 
MARTIN S. OVARD, Rh.-,, 5. uVAr , 
BEN F. OVARD, HELEN T. OVARD, 
AND JAX HAYES PETTEY, 
Counterclaimants, 
v. 
JOSEPH D. SANDERS, CHERYL " 
SANDERS, UTAH STATE TAX 
COMMISSION, SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
and INSURANCE COMPANY OF 
NORTH AMERTPA 
Counterdefendants. 
FINDINGS Ofc . «v . 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
luj.;. Noel 
The above entitled action came on regularly foi tiiaL on 
October 26 and 27, 1987, before the Ho m 11 .i \> I > • C'IMMI U I 
Judge of the above-entitled court, sitting without a jury, with 
David R. Olsen and Gary R. Henrie of the law firm of SUITTER, 
AXLAND, ARMSTRONG & HANSON appearing as counsel for Plaintiffs, 
and with Thomas N. Crowther of the law firm of PARSONS & CROWTHER 
appearing as counsel for Defendants and with no appearance having 
been made by or on behalf of Counterdefendants Utah State Tax 
Commission, Salt Lake County and Insurance Company of North 
America, with Defendants having stipulated to the dismissal of 
Counterdef endants Utah State Tax Commission and Salt Lake County 
and Defendants and Counterdefendant Insurance Company of North 
America having stipulated as to issues between them. Having 
heard testimony of witnesses, having received and reviewed 
exhibits, having heard arguments of counsel at trial and having 
heard arguments of counsel at a hearing on February 12, 1988, on 
Defendant's Motion for Attorney's Fees, having taken the issues 
and matters raised at trial and upon Defendant's Motion for 
Attorney's Fees under advisement, the Court with the parties 
agreement having personally viewed the property in question, 
having heard arguments of Counsel on Plaintiff's objections to 
Defendants' proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law and 
judgment and decree of foreclosure, and being now fully advised 
in the premises and of the law and facts in this matter, the 
Court hereby makes and enters the following Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law. 
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"TNDINGS OF FAC^ 
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D e f e n d . ^ * - * 
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3 . in I i 11 I i M ' 1 i 111 VI i I I in I h e Aq r p erne n i a nd f he q i v i nq o f. t tit.* 
W a r r a n t y Deed a n d y n t 1 ' L M i !'« « <' ' 
P l a i n t i f f s JII m a b o u t N o v e m b e r -\ *« i-ade a n a : e i L v e : e d 
D e t e n d a n l -i , I a . " . I • . ' ' ' I U ' -• *r <-: ^ 
w i t h i n t e r e s t at" lb% p e r a n n u m , wi \ L i t v / c i u -
I in I, I m i h m nq p a y a b 1 P O n f h a I d i t e , i n : -
p r i n c i p a I , I i" I h ' • • • , ' ' ,t -u 
1 5 , 148 5 ( t lie " N o t e " i 
I i iii i iMynnMil MI lli»» i n d e b t e d n e s s e v i d e n c e d by t h e 
N o t e , P 1 a i n 11 f f s o n o r a b o u t N o - * *: 
d e l i v e r e d to Defendants a T r u s t Deed recorded November 8, 1982, 
in book 5418 a t page 1755 as ent ry no. 3727947 (the "Trus t Deed") 
cover ing o the r p r o p e r t y l o c a t e d in S a l t Lake County, S t a t e of 
Utah and d e s c r i b e d in E x h i b i t "C" a t t a c h e d h e r e t o ( t he "Trus t 
Deed Proper ty") . 
5 . P r i o r t o c l o s i n g of t h e s a l e between Defendants and 
P l a i n t i f f s , Defendants had in t h e i r p o s s e s s i o n a copy of a 
subdivision map showing the Property as a l o t in a subdiv is ion . 
6. Defendant Sam Ovard knew t h a t P l a i n t i f f s home a d j a c e n t 
to the Proper ty had been b u i l t by a u t h o r i t y of a variance placing 
t h e home on a two a c r e p a r c e l , one a c r e of which was t h e 
P r o p e r t y . P l a i n t i f f s did not purchase t h e i r home from any of the 
Defendants. 
7 . No D e f e n d a n t n o r a g e n t of any of t h e D e f e n d a n t s 
d i s c l o s e d t o P l a i n t i f f s p r i o r t o s a l e of t h e P r o p e r t y t o 
P l a i n t i f f s t h a t such subdiv i s ion map was or was not approved nor 
t h a t t h e S a n d e r s ' home was or was n o t b u i l t p u r s u a n t to a 
v a r i a n c e , and P l a i n t i f f s d id not ask for or r e q u e s t any such 
information. 
8 . P l a i n t i f f s have made only one payment to Defendants 
under the Note, which payment was an i n t e r e s t payment in t h e 
amount of $5,000 made on or about March 1, 1984. 
9. Defendants have h e r e t o f o r e a t t emp ted to f o r e c l o s e the 
T r u s t Deed in a n o n - j u d i c i a l t r u s t deed f o r e c l o s u r e , which 
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13. Defendants have incurred costs and expenses, including 
attorney's fees, in connection with this action and collection on 
the Note. 
14. Plaintiffs claim that Defendants and/or their agents 
misrepresented facts and failed to state facts concerning whether 
the Property was a "building lot", thereby connoting that the 
Property was an "approved" building lot. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court hereby makes 
and enters the following Conclusions of Law: 
1. Defendants claims against Counterdefendants Utah State 
Tax Commission and Salt Lake County should be dismissed without 
prejudice. 
2. Plaintiffs have defaulted and are in default in payment 
to Defendants of amounts required to be paid under the Note. 
3. As a result of such default, Defendants are entitled to 
judgment against Plaintiffs, jointly and severally, in the amount 
of $40,600.50, which consists of $25,900 principal, interest in 
the amount of $14,285.54 accrued and unpaid to and including 
October 26, 1987 (as the trial date to which interest was 
previously calculated) and $10.64 per diem for each day 
thereafter to and including December 4, 1988, the date of the 
Court's decision in this matter. 
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a c u l - d e - s a c , and under t h e t o t a l i t y of c i r c u m s t a n c e s , a 
r e a s o n a b l e person should have been a l e r t e d t h a t t h e r e may be 
acces s problems a s s o c i a t e d with the P r o p e r t y t h a t should have 
been i n v e s t i g a t e d . 
1 1 . P l a i n t i f f s a r e not e n t i t l e d t o damatges or r e s c i s s i o n 
under any of t h e i r causes of a c t i on . 
1 2 . The i n j u n c t i o n h e r e t o f o r e e n t e r e d by t h e C o u r t 
e n j o i n i n g Defendants from pursuing any forec losure process under 
the T r u s t Deed should be t e r m i n a t e d , and judgmen t s h o u l d be 
e n t e r e d awarding Defendants the monetary amounts above s e t forth 
and providing for comple t ion of Defendants 1 f o r e c l o s u r e of the 
T rus t Deed under the condi t ions se t for th in Finding of Fact no. 
DATED Mat J#> 1988. 
BY THE COURT: 
O^ -^-
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
SUITTER, AXLAND, ARMSTRONG & 
HANSON ^ 
Ffank G. Noel, District £ourt 
Judge 
ATTEST 




Beginning 919.35 feet North 0°23,08" East from the East quarter 
corner of Section 6, Township 4 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake 
Base and Meridian, and running thence South 76°11,02" West 221.90 
feet, thence North 0°23I08H East 163.44 feet, thence North 
57°28'51" East 137.16 feet, thence North 62°46,20" East 112.81 
feet, thence South 0°23f08" West 235.80 feet to the point of 
beginning. Together with a right-of-way 35 feet wide connecting 
to 13800 South Street. 
Subject to that certain Uniform Real Estate contract dated March 
28, 1974, in which LAWRENCE T. FRANTZ and ELSIE FRANTZ, his wife, 
are sellers and DAVID H. DAY and SUSAN B. DAY are buyers (effects 
only approximately the west 25 feet of the subject property). 
Grantors herein do not warrant fee title in grantees to said 
portion at this time, but do hereby convey any and all interest 
they may have in the same. 
Subject to two trust deeds of even date herewith in the amounts 
of $910.00 and $810.00, which Seller warrants will be reconveyed 
upon receipt of such sums by Grantor form Grantee. 
EXHIBIT "B" 
Beginning at a point 716.85 feet North 0°23f08" East and 186.90 
feet South 76°llf02" West from the East quarter corner of Section 
6, Township 4 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, 
and running thence South 76°llf02" West 35 feet; thence North 
0°23,08" East 202.5 feet; thence North 76°11,02" East 35 feet; 
thence South 0°23,08" West 202.5 feet to the point of beginning. 
Together with and subject to the following described 35 foot wide 
right of way: 
A 35 foot wide strip of land, the center line of which begins 
299.95 feet North 89°39I27M West from the East quarter corner of 
Section 6, Township 4 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and 
Meridian and runs thence North 0°23,08" East 311.30 feet; thence 
North 16°51,02" East 332.85 feet; thence North 0°23,08H East 
200.88 feet. 
EXHIBIT "C" 
Beginning at a point 716.85 feet North O^S'OS" East from the 
East quarter corner of Section 6, Township 4 South, Range 1 East, 
Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and running thence South 76°lll02" 
West 186.90 feet; thence North 0o23,08M East 202.5 feet; thence 
North 76ollf02,, East 186.90 feet; thence South 0o23,08,f West 
202.5 feet to the point of beginning. 
Together with a 35 foot wide right of way connecting to 13800 
South Street, and subject to a 35 foot wide right of way adjacent 
to and parallel with the West line of subject property described 
as follows: 
A 35 foot wide strip of land, the center line of which begins 
299.95 feet North 89°39l27" West from the East quarter corner of 
Section 6, Township 4 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and 
Meridian and runs thence North 0°23,08" East 311.30 feet; thence 
North 16°51,02H East 332.85 feet; thence North 0°23,08" East 
200.88 feet. 
annTCNDUM 4 
Thomas N. Crowther - 077 3 
CROWTHER & REED 
Attorneys for Defendants 
455 South 300 East, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-9865 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JOSEPH D. SANDERS and ) 
CHERYL M. SANDERS, ; 
Plaintiffs, ; 
vs. ] 
MARTIN S. OVARD, REVA S. OVARD, ] 
BEN F. OVARD, HELEN F. OVARD, 




i Civil No. 850904313 CV 
Plaintiffs1 Motion for Order Clarifying Judgment came on for 
hearing before the Honorable Frank G. Noel, Judge of the above 
entitled Court, on January 18, 1991, at 9:00 a.m. with Frederick 
N. Green appearing as counsel for Plaintiffs and with Thomas N. 
Crowther appearing as counsel for Defendants Ovard. The Court 
having considered memoranda submitted in connection with such 
Motion, having heard oral argument, having taken the matter under 
advisement and being fully advised, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED and the June 6, 1988 Judgment (the 
"Judgment11) heretofore entered by this Court is clarified as set 
forth below: 
HAY 3 1 
1. The Judgment entitled Defendants Ovard to proceed on a 
non-judicial foreclosure sale under their trust deed but did not 
require them to do so. 
2. The Judgment is a valid and binding judgment and Defen-
dants Ovard are entitled to collect thereon. 
3. The first lienholder in this matter has already foreclosed 
on the property which was subject to the trust deed of Defendants 
Ovard, and any lien said Defendants may have had on such property 
has been extinguished, and Defendants Ovard are therefore entitled 
to maintain a direct action to collect on their note secured by 
their trust deed, or more accurately stated in terms of this case 
are entitled to collect on the Judgment they have already obtained 
on such promissory note. 
>!U*HH4 D< , 1991, DATED:
 fc 
BY THE COURT 
By_ 
Frank G. Noel 
District Court Judge 
-2-
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The foregoing Order was served upon Plaintiffs by causing a 
copy of the same to be mailed, postage prepaid, to their attorney 
at the following Address this ;%Wday of March, 1991. 
Frederick N. Green 
528 Newhouse Building 
10 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Thomas N. Crowther 
C^tn^J^T 
-3-
